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1. The perils of experience 
“However paradoxical it may seem,” Hans-Georg Gadamer writes in Truth and Method, “the concept 
of experience [Erfahrung] seems to me one of the most unelucidated [unaufgeklärtesten] concepts we 
have.”2  
Indeed, the claim is striking. After all, few terms have been more central to the Western 
epistemological tradition, which, ever since Aristotle, has conceived of experience as an indispensable 
stage in the ascent to comprehensive knowledge and understanding. With the increasing doubts that 
late medieval and early modern philosophy cast upon the capacity of discursive reason to penetrate 
the innermost essence of nature on its own strength, experience emerged as the watchword with 
which modern science distinguished itself from the Aristotelian model of epistēmē, which is focused 
on intuitive insight and deductive reasoning. In his manifesto for an experimental scientific method, 
Novum Organum (1620), Sir Francis Bacon describes the incipient modern age as an age of experience 
(experientia), one in which “the store of experiences has grown immeasurably” in comparison to 
antiquity, with its greatly expanded perspective on history, unforeseen technical innovations, and the 
discovery of the New World and its peoples.3 Since Bacon and the British Empiricists, the emphasis 
                                                          
1 For valuable comments, I would like to thank Anniina Leiviskä and Harri Mäcklin. For financial support, I am grateful to 
the Academy of Finland research project The Intellectual Heritage of Radical Cultural Conservatism. 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik [1960], Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 352; Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marschall, 2nd ed. (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 341. Translation modified. 
3 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum [1620], ed. Thomas Fowler, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889); The New Organon, ed. 
Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.72.  
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on experience as the foundation of human knowledge has reverberated throughout modern 
philosophy. Kant begins the introduction to the second edition of his first Critique by stating: “There 
is no doubt whatever that all our cognition [Erkenntnis] begins with experience [Erfahrung]”—even 
though, he adds, this is so only in the chronological order, not in the sense that all knowledge would 
derive from experience.4 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, intended as the first part of his absolute system 
of science, is the “science of the experience of consciousness.”5 For Husserl, one of the last 
representatives of this classical modern tradition, the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) in which we are “always 
already living and which furnishes the ground for all cognitive performance and all scientific 
determination,” is precisely the “world of experience.”6 
Nonetheless, according to Gadamer, the full implications of the concept of experience have 
remained insufficiently elucidated, due to a one-sided “epistemological schematization that . . . 
truncates its original content.”7 The Western philosophical tradition has considered experience in a 
teleological framework as a means to an end, as a faculty from which knowledge and truth can be 
extracted through the proper implementation of a scientific method, a systematic pursuit (methodos) of 
higher forms of knowing.8 Superior knowledge can be attained only when the inherent shortcomings 
of “raw” or “ordinary” experience are overcome through proper methodical discipline. For 
Gadamer, this methodical drive towards overcoming the vicissitudes, the risks and perils of 
experience, is, to a certain extent, inherent in the nature of experiencing itself: experience “naturally” 
seeks repetition, confirmation, and certainty in order to consolidate itself and restrict the possibility 
of further, unpredictable experience. We learn from experience when, through our encounters with 
things, we become prepared for what may come, that is, when the accumulation of experiences 
prevents further encounters from taking us by surprise. Learning can only be achieved by 
systematizing and synthesizing the historical multiplicity of shifting experiences into increasingly 
constant unities. In this sense, “by its very essence, experience merges [aufhebt] its history into itself 
and thus obliterates it.”9  
                                                          
4 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1781/1787], ed. Jens Timmermann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), 43; Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136 [B 1]. 
5 G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes [1807], ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), 29, 61; Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2nd ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), 20, 53. 
6 Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik [1939], ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, 7th ed. (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1999), 38; Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 41. 
7 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 352; Truth and Method, 341 (trans. modified). 
8 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 353; Truth and Method, 342. 
9 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 353; Truth and Method, 342 (trans. modified). 
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However, it is precisely the historical multiplicity, singularity, and unpredictability of 
experience, which is seen as a weakness from the point of view of scientific method, that Gadamerian 
hermeneutics seeks to explore and elucidate. Taking our cue from several seminal texts highlighted 
by Gadamer himself, first and foremost, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics, Bacon’s Novum 
Organum, and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, we will sketch an outline of certain key stages in the 
conceptual history of experience in the epistemological tradition in the coming sections.10 This will 
enable us to place the Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutic radicalization of the concept of 
experience into a historical context as an attempt to overcome the limitations of the methodical 
approach to experience and to grasp experience anew as the finite human being’s finite—that is, 
inherently singular and transformative, and, in that sense, risky and perilous—encounter with reality. 
 
 
2. Aristotle: experience between the particular and the universal 
The Presocratics Parmenides and Heraclitus generally depreciate experience. For them, philosophical 
thinking constitutes a radical break with the multiplicity of situated, particular perspectives or 
“acceptances” (doxai) of ordinary “mortal” experience and entails an insight into the fundamental 
unity of all beings in the mode of intuitive beholding (noos) or discursive articulation (logos).11 
Parmenides’ goddess exhorts the thinker not to let “custom [ethos] force you upon the way of much 
experience [polypeiron hodon], / heeding the unregardful eye and the roaring hearing / and the tongue; 
rather, discern through discursive articulation [krinai . . . logō].”12 Plato, too, mainly views empeiria in a 
derogatory manner, as a mere business or occupation (epitēdeusis, tribē), such as rhetoric, that does not 
constitute an art (technē) based on rational insight but rather requires proficiency acquired through 
mere habituation.13 
Aristotle, however, takes a different approach. For him, there is a relationship of continuity 
between experience and rational insight. In his genealogy of human knowledge and understanding in 
the first book of the Metaphysics and in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle describes empeiria as the point 
                                                          
10 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 353–362; Truth and Method, 343–350. For more detailed and comprehensive conceptual 
histories of experience, see Fritz-Peter Hager, “Empeiria,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2, ed. Joachim Ritter 
(Basel: Schwabe, 1972), 453–454; Friedrich Kambartel, “Erfahrung,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2, 609–617. 
11 Jussi Backman, “Towards a Genealogy of the Metaphysics of Sight: Seeing, Hearing, and Thinking in Heraclitus and 
Parmenides,” in Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, ed. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 9–34. 
12 Parmenides, DK 28 B 7.3–5, in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 1, 6th ed. (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1951). 
13 Plato, Gorgias, in Platonis opera, vol. 3, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), 462b10–463b4. 
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of divergence between the cognitive capacities of the human being and those of nonhuman animals. 
Animals are distinguished from plants by sense perception (aisthēsis), the innate capacity for 
apprehending their environment through the senses; some animals further possess memory (mnēmē), 
that is, the ability to retain sensations beyond the immediate act of perceiving them.14 Of the animals 
that remember, some (first and foremost, humans) are further capable of discursively articulating 
their sensations with the help of a conceptual determination (logos), which then allows them to identify 
certain perceptions as sharing one and the same object with previous perceptions retained in 
memory.15 It is this latter perception of identity, the attainment of a “universal [katholou] that has 
come to rest in its entirety in the soul, a unity that is apart from the many [retained sensations] and 
is present in all of them as one and the same,” that grounds experience (empeiria).16  
Experience is, for Aristotle, an essentially discursive capacity for accumulating propositions 
(hypolēpseis) regarding particular cases (kath’ hekaston) with some degree of identity. Experience tells 
us, for example, that patient A with a certain kind of ailment benefited from a certain treatment and 
that this was also the case for patients B and C with similar ailments, which then encourages us to 
apply the same treatment in the similar case of patient D.17 The sufficient accretion of such individual 
experiences finally allows us to move to a new level of abstraction, formulating a general rule—for 
example, that treatments of a certain type will benefit a certain type of patients with certain 
symptoms. This step from habitual familiarity to the possession of a universal principle is the step 
from experience to technē, technical expertise or “art.”18 What distinguishes the expert or master 
craftsperson (architektōn) possessing technē from the experienced worker (cheirotechnēs), whose hability 
is an incommunicable “manual” routine (ethos) acquired by doing, is the former’s insight into formal 
principles and her ability to teach her expertise (verbally and discursively) to others.19  
Experience is thus the necessary preliminary to the more comprehensive, discursive, and 
systematic forms of knowledge constituted through the human soul’s natural capacity to discursively 
synthesize and articulate sensations and to abstract from them more and more comprehensive 
conceptual unities. Aristotle is no empiricist in the modern sense: even though sense perception and 
the accumulation of experience necessarily precede in time the higher, more abstract levels of 
knowledge concerning the ideal structures of reality, such knowledge is not reducible to individual 
                                                          
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1.1.980a27–b25; Posterior Analytics, in Analytica 
priora et posteriora, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 2.19.99b32–100a1. 
15 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.9.100a1–3, 15–b1. 
16 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19.100a3–8; cf. Metaphysics 1.1.980b25–981a1, 5–7. 
17 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981a7–9. 
18 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981a1–12. 
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981a12–b10. 
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perceptions. For the Aristotelian tradition, “induction,” epagōgē, does not mean simply the logical 
derivation of the universal from particular cases, but more generally the literal “guidance,” the agōgē 
or ductio, provided by experience of particulars toward an intuitive grasp of the universal.20 
We thus find in the Aristotelian account a teleological and methodological instrumentalization 
of experience as a pathway to a level of certainty and necessity that is itself, in some sense, beyond 
experience. For Aristotle, the important epistemological limitation of experience in the ordinary sense 
is its contingency, its dependence on random individual encounters with particular phenomena. 
Experience is exclusively awareness of facts, of the bare contingent “that” (to hoti), without their 
underlying principles or grounds, the “because” (dioti).21 Knowledge, however, cannot be satisfied 
with the contingent. Philosophy as a theoretical project starts from wonder (thaumazein), inspired by 
things that happen to be at hand (ta procheira), but ultimately seeks the grounds of everything that 
there is.22 The path of knowledge must thus lead from sensible particulars, “better known and more 
evident to us” in the genealogical and developmental order, to the most universal determinations, 
“better known and more evident in the order of nature.” In Kantian terms, this refers to that which 
is known after the fact, a posteriori, to that which is known before all facts, a priori, and is necessarily 
true regardless of the situation.23  
 
 
                                                          
20 Aristotle, Topics, in Topica et Sophistici elenchi, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 1.12.105a13–16, 18.108b9–11; 
cf. Physics, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 1.2.185a12–14. Cf. Posterior Analytics 2.5.91b34–35: “For the one 
who shows something by induction [epagōn] does not demonstrate by argument [apodeiknysin], but, nonetheless, makes 
something evident [dēloi].” See also Rudolf Ružička, “Induktion I,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, ed. Joachim 
Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1976), 323–329. 
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1.981a24–30. 
22 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2.982b11–28. 
23 Aristotle, Physics 1.1.184a16–21; Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b29–72a5. Note, however, that while according to the Posterior 
Analytics, what is closest to us are sensible particulars, from which we proceed toward universals, in the Physics (1.1.184a21–
b14), Aristotle states that what we actually initially encounter in sense perception is a confused and indeterminate general 
notion (e.g., “animal”) which is then defined and analyzed into more specific kinds (horses, cows etc.). The latter description 
fits Aristotle’s historical account of the development of philosophy in the first book of Physics as the emergence of increasingly 
sophisticated conceptual distinctions. Both accounts stress that knowledge essentially strives for a grasp of the causes (aitia) 
and principles (archai) of things, which are universals in the true sense of the word. Bacon (Novum Organum 1.19, 1.104) criticizes 
the Aristotelian method precisely for leaping too quickly over the passage from particulars to universals, which for him is the 
only true path of science. 
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3. Bacon: From experience to experiment 
The Aristotelian understanding of experience held sway throughout the Aristotelian tradition up to 
Thomas Aquinas.24 It is not until early modernity that an upheaval in the status of experience takes 
place. The important philosophical difference between the Aristotelian and the early modern thinkers 
was that the latter had largely, if often implicitly, accepted the consequences of the theological 
voluntarism of the late medieval via moderna, represented in various forms by scholastics such as John 
Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Gabriel Biel. Voluntarists saw the rational, moral, and physical 
order of created nature, to which God’s “ordained power” (potentia ordinata) has normally been 
committed since creation, as ultimately contingent and constantly capable of being overridden by 
God’s exercise of the primordial absolute freedom of his will, his absolute power (potentia absoluta).25 
This approach was closely linked to the nominalist ascription of a purely intramental existence to the 
forms and structures of human understanding, which have gradually become “ideas” in the modern 
sense.26  
With these theological and metaphysical views operating in their background, the early 
moderns were beset by a new skepticism: they could no longer simply regard natural philosophy as 
a straightforward matter of discovering, by means of reason alone, immediately accessible rational 
principles inherent in nature itself. For Descartes, who considers even mathematical truths to be 
contingent upon the divine will, there is a plausible danger that the workings of our created reason 
are inherently distorted.27 In order to avert this risk, our reason has to be provided with a guarantee: 
                                                          
24 Thomas Aquinas, for example, simply reiterates Aristotle’s definition of experience (experientia) as a synthesis of many 
remembrances; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Pars Prima, Quaestiones L–CXIX, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, 
vol. 5 (Rome: Polyglotta, 1889), 1.58.3. 
25 See William J. Courtenay, “Potentia absoluta/ordinata,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 7, ed. Joachim Ritter 
and Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), 1157–1162. For this thesis concerning the influence of the Christian doctrine 
of creation and its radicalization in late medieval philosophy on the foundations of modern empirical science, see, e.g., Michael 
B. Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science,” Mind 43 (1934): 446–468; Francis 
Oakley, “Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of Laws of Nature,” Church History 30 
(1961): 433–457. For a critical modification of this view, emphasizing that not only early modern empiricism but equally the 
rationalism of Descartes was based on the voluntarist understanding of the primacy of the divine will, see Peter Harrison, 
“Voluntarism and Early Modern Science,” History of Science 40 (2002): 63–89. Cf. John Henry, “Voluntarist Theology at the 
Origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison,” History of Science 47 (2009): 79–113. 
26 On the emergence of the modern concept of “idea,” first and foremost introduced by Descartes, see Wilhelm Halbfass, 
“Idee III,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, 102–113. 
27 In his letter of April 15, 1630 to Marin Mersenne, Descartes defends the view that even “eternal” truths, such as those of 
mathematics, were created by God because he willed thus; René Descartes, Correspondance avril 1622 – février 1638, ed. Charles 
Adam and Paul Tannery, Œuvres, vol. 1 (Paris: Vrin, 1897), 145–146; The Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham et al., The 
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indubitable proof of the existence of God as a perfect being who would not will to deceive our reason 
as long as it operates with the simple, clear, and distinct ideas placed in it by its creator.28 The British 
empiricists will, of course, accept the same general predicament of reason—that it is not in a position 
to claim direct access to the “mind of God” and the intelligible foundations of his creation—but go 
on to reject the Cartesian way out, denying the existence of pregiven necessary ideas in the human 
mind, famously viewed by Locke in its initial state as “white paper, void of all characters.” According 
to Locke, whatever ideas arise in the mind are to be regarded as the result of experience, which he 
understands in a general and vague sense comprising the mind’s individual sensory encounters with 
reality, its reflective encounters with itself, as well as the imprints and lasting syntheses produced in 
the mind by these encounters.29  
The first outline of what developed into the modern scientific method was famously drawn by 
Sir Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum (1620)—a work purporting to present a “new organon,” a 
new “instrument” or methodology of science to replace the “old organon” of Aristotle’s logic and 
forming part of Bacon’s unfinished overarching project Instauratio Magna, the “great renewal” of 
science. The aim of his new logic of scientific inquiry, Bacon declares in his dedicatory letter to King 
James I, is to ensure that “after so many ages of the world” without adequate progress, science and 
philosophy will no longer “float in the air, but rest upon the solid foundations of every kind of 
experience [experientiae] properly considered.”30 In their modern rebirth (regeneratio) envisioned by 
Bacon, the sciences will be “raised up in a sure order from experience and founded anew, which no 
one . . . would affirm has yet been done or contemplated.”31  
Like his younger contemporary Descartes, Bacon emphasizes the distance between human 
notions and the ideas of the divine mind according to which the true essences or forms of things are 
created.32 Only God has immediate access to these forms; we finite beings must discover them 
gradually and incompletely through the study of nature.33 Such a study should not attempt to simply 
                                                          
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23. The famous hypothetical “evil 
demon” argument regarding the possibility of complete deception is presented in Descartes’s First Meditation; Meditationes de 
prima philosophia [1641], ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Œuvres, vol. 7 (Paris: Vrin, 1904), 20–23; Meditations on First 
Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 14–15. 
28 This proof is given in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Meditations; Descartes, Meditationes, 34–90; Meditations, 24–62.   
29 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 104 
[2.1.2]. 
30 Bacon, Novum Organum, dedicatory letter. 
31 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.97. 
32 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.23. 
33 Bacon, Novum Organum 2.15. 
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leap from the particulars of experience to intuitive and abstract axioms of reason, as Bacon accuses 
traditional (Aristotelian) induction of doing. The Aristotelian method has resulted in a natural 
philosophy that is basically a mere self-reflection of the human mind on its own vague and deficient 
concepts and, for the most part, simply “voices dialectical terms.”34 Its basic fault is to regard the 
constitution of knowledge as a natural process to which the human mind is inherently suited. Rather, 
Bacon maintains, certain innate tendencies and inclinations of the human mind hamper and distort 
its access to nature. These are the four famous “idols” or “illusions” (idola) of our reason, which are 
related to the inherent limitations of the human sensory and cognitive capacities, the specific 
situatedness of the individual human being, the limits imposed by the shared language and discourse 
of human communities, and misleading intellectual doctrines and traditions.35 The different 
prejudices arising from these tendencies must be acknowledged and obliterated in order to gain 
access to the hidden truths of creation.  
Thus, experience in itself does not guide us toward higher forms of knowing, but must first be 
subjected to a systematic and methodical procedure. Our ordinary mode of experiencing, Bacon 
argues, is “blind and stupid,” errant and wandering in that it takes its lead from mere random 
encounters with things (ex occursu rerum): the objects of further investigation are simply come across 
(inveniunt) in a casual manner.36 This leaves knowledge to the “waves and winding of chance [casus] 
and casual, unregulated experience [experientiae vagae et inconditae].” Dependence on experiences that 
merely occur by chance is like groping around in the dark in hopes of stumbling upon the right path. 
Experience must be undiluted by human idols, but not passive; in addition to actively purging our 
own understanding of hindrances, we must also take an active stance towards nature. The student of 
nature must interrogate nature, pose questions to it. Only experience that is actively sought after, 
“requested” (quaesita), deserves the name of “experiment” (experimentum).37 Bacon likens such active, 
productive experiencing to the divine act of creation: just as God created light before any determinate 
thing, scientific inquiry must be illuminated by the light of the proper “experimental” method that 
eliminates randomness and contingency before embarking on particular experiments.38  
Methodical experimenting allows us to overcome the great inherent weakness of experience: 
the uncertainty and fallibility due to the constant possibility of a negative experience. Bacon is fully 
aware of this negative dimension of experience and its importance with regard to the inherent bias 
                                                          
34 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.63, 1.104. 
35 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.39–69. 
36 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.70. 
37 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.82. 
38 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.70, 1.82. 
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of the mind in favor of positive instances that confirm prejudices and superstitions.39 However, in 
order to extract positive results from experience, this negativity must be appropriately managed. The 
manifest problem with inductive reasoning from experience, in the traditional sense of simply 
enumerating instances that support a given generalization, is that it is constantly “exposed to the 
danger [periculo] of the contrary instance.”40 In the method elaborated by Bacon in the second book 
of the Novum Organum, termed “written” or “literate” experience (experientia literata), this risk is 
controlled by a systematic separation of positive and negative instances.41 For any natural 
phenomenon whose nature we wish to understand (in Bacon’s example, heat), we carefully draw a 
table of instances in which the phenomenon in question is present and another table of relevant 
negative cases, in which it is absent. By comparing these lists, it is ultimately possible to come up 
with a conjecture concerning the fundamental nature, form, or source of the phenomenon for which 
there is no contradictory instance.42 In this way, negative experience is systematically charted and 
subordinated to the attainment of positive knowledge concerning the causal laws of phenomena, 
which Bacon understands in terms of Aristotelian “formal causes” or essences.43  
 
 
4. Hegel: The negativity of experience 
Humean skeptical empiricism, of course, takes the danger or peril of the negative instance even more 
seriously than Bacon. While the latter thinks that the danger can ultimately be overcome through 
methodical experiencing that will allow us to map the necessary causal grounds of phenomena, Hume 
calls into doubt whether any observed causal regularity, no matter how strongly corroborated, can 
rationally entitle us to exclude the constant possibility of a contrary instance. But let us focus for a 
moment on the danger as such. Claude Romano draws our attention to the fact that experience 
(experientia) and peril (periculum) are cognates—together with a host of related words, such as the 
English “fear,” the German Erfahrung and Gefahr “danger,” and the Greek empeiria and peira “trial, 
attempt,” they allegedly go back to the Proto-Indo-European root *per- “to try, to risk.”44 Experience, 
                                                          
39 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.46. 
40 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.105. 
41 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.101, 1.103, 1.110. 
42 Bacon, Novum Organum 1.105, 2.1, 2.11–20. 
43 Bacon, Novum Organum 2.1–2. 
44 Claude Romano, L’événement et le monde (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), 195–196; Event and World, trans. Shane 
McKinlay (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 145. On the etymology of experience, see, e.g., Calvert Watkins, ed., 
The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 66. 
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experientia, empeiria is thus literally knowledge that has undergone a peira, a risky trial or test—it is 
tested knowledge, “imperiled” knowledge. But what does this putting-to-the-test, this trial, consist 
of precisely?  
In experience, it is clearly we ourselves—our knowledge and know-how, our capacity for 
coping with the things that face us—who are put to test. As Romano puts it, the “danger” of 
experience is “such that I put myself at risk in it in the first person, . . . in what constitutes me 
essentially as such: in my selfhood.”45 What tests and tries us in experience are precisely the singular 
and contingent situations in the context of which we encounter reality and are compelled to cope 
with it. The risk or “peril” involved in such situations is precisely the risk of failure—the risk of a 
negative instance in which our knowledge does not pass the test of the encounter but rather fails to 
cope adequately and is consequently compelled to transform and modify itself. This structure of 
experience through trial and error is presupposed by Aristotle as well as Bacon; and yet, as Gadamer 
emphasizes, the teleology inherent in their respective scientific ideals focuses not on the negativity 
of the test, risk, or peril as such, but rather on the positivity of its outcome, on the knowledge that, 
by virtue of its superior universality, ultimately survives the process of experiencing and is thus alleged 
to be increasingly immune to further experience, to the peril of future contingent encounters.46 For 
axiomatic-deductive as well as experimental-inductive science (even though the latter is, in principle, 
committed to empirical fallibilism, to an ultimate falsifiability of all assumptions by experience), the 
basic function of experience is to increasingly immunize knowledge against further experience. 
This is so, Gadamer adds, even for the last great architect of a purely speculative system of 
science—Hegel, who lays perhaps more weight on the inherent negativity of experience than any 
other thinker of the tradition. The “science of the experience of consciousness” charted in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit is the study of the development and unfolding of the spirit (Geist) to itself as 
spirit, that is, as absolute subjectivity, as the fundamental self-conscious “substance” of reality. In its 
different developmental stages, the spirit’s consciousness contains two fundamental moments: that 
of knowledge (Wissen) and that of the object (Gegenstand) known. The latter is “negative” with regard 
to knowledge in the sense that it is never completely immanent to knowledge. The experience of 
consciousness is, in each instance, its awareness of this disparity or opposition between its current 
state of knowledge and the object of this knowledge, between knowledge and truth, between the “for 
us” and the “in itself.”47 In other words, experience is fundamentally a negative experience of the 
current finitude of our knowledge. 
                                                          
45 Romano, L’événement et le monde, 196; Event and World, 145. 
46 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 355–359; Truth and Method, 344–348. 
47 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 29–30, 58–62; Phenomenology of Mind, 20–21, 50–53. 
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However, against Kant’s critical philosophy, Hegel presupposes that this disparity and finitude 
is a position in which knowledge, in its inherent will towards the absolute and the infinite, cannot 
and will not remain. Experience consists of testing (Prüfung) our knowledge with regard to the object; 
the discovery that there is more to the object than our current, inadequate cognitive grasp of it can 
access necessitates a dialectical movement towards a new perspective, a passage to a new stage of 
consciousness in which the current disparity is resolved in an enlarged, synthetic grasp of the object 
that includes the prior negativity within itself. With this movement, not only knowledge but also its 
object and the very criterion of knowledge are transformed.48 Thus, for example, in the first dialectical 
step of the Phenomenology, the most elementary form of consciousness—the immediate sensory 
awareness of the here-and-now—is dialectically transformed into an articulate perception of a 
determinate object that retains its identity throughout a temporal and spatial manifold of sensations. 
Experience is, for Hegel, the “dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself—on its 
knowledge as well as its object—in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises.”49 While 
the inherent negativity of experience, the disparity between the conscious ego and the object of 
consciousness, can be regarded “as the defect [Mangel] of both opposites,” it is nonetheless “their 
very soul, that which animates them [das Bewegende].”50 
Experience is thus, for Hegel, more than knowledge encountering reality, more than simply 
testing knowledge with regard to something fundamentally external to it. Rather, experience is the 
process through which the spirit, absolute subjectivity, gradually encounters itself as spirit and tests 
itself. Through experience, the spirit’s internal contradictions and disparities are gradually resolved 
as it gains a more and more comprehensive and mediated grasp of itself as the fundamental rational, 
discursive, conceptual, and ideal structure of reality. At the end of this process stands the spirit’s 
complete reconciliation with itself: absolute knowledge, a purely positive perspective of the spirit 
upon itself that leaves no residual disparity or negativity, and consequently, no room for further 
experience. The experience of consciousness culminates in the impossibility of further experience in 
the strict sense. On this absolute level of knowledge, the remaining task in the system of absolute 
science is the elaboration of the conceptual architecture of the discursive contents of knowledge, a task 
that is performed by the purely speculative science of logic.51            
 
 
                                                          
48 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 59–60; Phenomenology of Mind, 51. 
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5. Hermeneutic experience as experience of finitude 
In his 1942–43 reading of the Introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger highlights the way 
in which Hegel’s concept of experience is determined by the absolute teleology of his dialectic, which 
Heidegger sees as a point of culmination in the history of Western “ontotheological” metaphysics.52 
“Ontotheology” here designates the Platonic and Aristotelian foundationalist approach in which the 
ontological question concerning being qua being—that which determines everything that is insofar 
as it is—is considered in terms of the ideal, supreme, and perfect, “divine” (theion), manifestation or 
instance of being. For Plato, this is the Idea of the Good, for Aristotle, the metaphysical divinity as 
the perfectly actualized, simple, and identical substance.53 In Hegel’s Phenomenology, the experience of 
consciousness is the process of the spirit’s unfolding presence to itself—the unfolding of the 
fundamental and ultimate level of meaningful reality, which Hegel ultimately understands as the self-
consciousness of absolute subjectivity, as the subjectity or subjectness (Subjektität) of all conscious 
subjects. As Heidegger interprets it, the “experience” articulated in The Phenomenology of Spirit is the 
process by which this absolute comes to be “with us” (bei uns), by which it gradually sheds its 
transcendence with regard to finite knowledge and becomes accessible to “us,” to finite subjectivity. 
The absolute reveals itself as the absoluteness inherent in subjectivity itself—as the intelligible and 
rational, conceptual and discursive structure that comprehends everything that is.54 As the coming-
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into-presence, the Parousia, of the absolute, Hegelian “[e]xperience is that being [Sein] in accordance 
with which the absolute wills to be with us.”55  
Once the experience of consciousness is completed in absolute knowledge and the absolute 
thus becomes accessible within the immanence of self-consciousness, ontotheology has reached its 
fullest possible extent. Heidegger’s later thought, following his Contributions to Philosophy (1936–38), 
was centered on exploring his notion of the contemporary possibility of another beginning or 
inception (Anfang)—a new, postontotheological starting point for a postmetaphysical, radically 
hermeneutic thinking that would call into question certain fundamental presuppositions of the 
Presocratic and Platonic “first beginning” of Western metaphysics.56 In contrast to the 
ontotheological drive toward an absolute point of view, postmetaphysical thinking would embrace 
the finitude, that is, the temporal and spatial situatedness and the historical, cultural, and linguistic 
context-sensitivity of human thought—more specifically, of the dynamic and reciprocal correlation 
between the human being and being that the later Heidegger captures in the title Ereignis, “event.”  
Gadamer’s outline of a hermeneutic concept of experience should be understood in the context 
of this Heideggerian break with ontotheology that renounces the Hegelian teleological aspiration to 
an absolute and infinite grasp of being in the sense of the accessibility and intelligibility of beings. 
Gadamer’s particular contribution in this regard is his attempt to reappropriate the concept of 
experience for a radical hermeneutic philosophy of the irreducibly historical and interpretive 
character of all understanding. The resources for this reappropriation can be found within the 
philosophical history of the concept of experience itself, in the intrinsic dimensions of experience 
that the epistemological tradition certainly acknowledged but regarded as weaknesses or deficiencies 
that must be overcome by truly scientific thinking: (1) its contingency, that is, its essentially 
uncontrollable and unrepeatable nature; (2) its singularity or situated particularity, that is, its irreducible 
relativity to individual experiential situations with their varying prejudices and expectations; and (3) 
its negativity, that is, its potential for undermining and transforming all pre-established judgments and 
cognitive frameworks. As we have seen, the Aristotelian, Baconian, and Hegelian notions of 
experience as a method, as a pathway to science, all sought to immunize scientific knowledge against 
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these aspects of experience by envisioning a transition from experience to the most universal and 
fundamental intuitive principles or axioms of intelligibility, to the discovery of the hidden truths or 
essences of nature through the systematic experimental management of empirical data, or to the 
absolute self-consciousness in which there is no longer any disparity between knowledge and its 
object. In other words, all three thinkers of the tradition ultimately seek to attain, through experience, 
a kind of knowledge that is no longer susceptible to experience.  
Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics, by contrast, discovers the true hermeneutic 
fruitfulness of experience in precisely these aspects. Hermeneutic experience is historical experience 
enacted in singular historical situations of meaningfulness. Such situations are, as articulated in Truth 
and Method, always entered in terms of our individual prejudices, of a pre-existing cultural 
understanding, of discourses and conceptual and linguistic frameworks inherited from our tradition.57 
When making sense of any meaningful phenomenon encountered in the situation, we primarily 
interpret it in terms of our preunderstanding, applying the discourses and concepts that we already 
possess. However, according to the Heideggerian and Gadamerian model of the hermeneutic circle, 
if approached in a proper manner—in the form of a genuine question that acknowledges the finitude 
of our knowledge—these phenomena can, in turn, work retroactively on our preunderstanding and 
disclose its insufficiency, its inability to make sense of certain aspects of what is read, heard, or 
encountered.58 This discovery of insufficiency then encourages us to reconsider and revise our 
prejudices, our existing conceptual framework—and it is precisely this feature that makes this 
discovery an “experience.” In the context of the hermeneutic circle, the capacity for experience is 
precisely the capacity for being tested and “imperiled” by situations of interpretation in unpredictable 
ways, for encountering the irreducible negative otherness in phenomena that our current 
preunderstanding and our current conceptual framework are in some respect inadequate for making 
sense of. Thus, openness to hermeneutic experience means accepting, ever anew, the necessity of 
undergoing a transformation, of reconsidering and revising our current mode and our current 
discursive tools for understanding, interpreting, and making sense.  
In this sense, as Gadamer points out, a truly meaningful—that is, transformative—experience 
is analogous to an encounter with another person in the second person singular, as a “thou” (Du) 
with whom we are engaged in a genuine conversation. A “thou” always carries a foreign element 
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irreducible to the “I” and therefore can never, in an encounter that takes place within the ethical 
dimension, be a simple object. Interpreting a text, a discourse belonging to a textual tradition, cannot 
be carried out in the role of an impassive and neutral observer—it always compels the interpreter to 
engage, from out of her specific historical and discursive position, with another “speaker,” another 
historical and discursive position which, if genuinely questioned and properly “listened” to, cannot 
avoid affecting the questioner herself. This is the Gadamerian model of “historically effected 
consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein), a consciousness of history not as a mere object of 
study but as the living network of a tradition within which we ourselves are caught and involved.59 
Through a transformative discursive exchange with the “thou,” we can ultimately become 
incorporated into a new “we,” an entirely new shared perspective on the world. In such a hermeneutic 
“fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung), which is something entirely novel with regard to the 
horizons fused in it, our self is irreparably transformed.60 But only a finite self can encounter another 
as a genuine “thou”; only a finite self is susceptible to contingent, singular, and transformative 
encounters with that which comes from beyond its proper realm, in other words, to experiences. 
“Hermeneutic consciousness culminates not in methodological sureness of itself, but in the same 
readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced person from the one captivated by 
dogma.”61  
Among more recent contributions to the theory of hermeneutic experience, the subtle account 
articulated in Claude Romano’s Event and World (1998) approaches experience as exposure to events, 
to the singular takings-place of meaningfulness that have no substantial and repeatable identity. These 
events are precisely moments of transformation and rupture with previous identities after which 
nothing has exactly the same meaning as it did before.62 This singularity and unrepeatability of the 
events of experience is the fundamental reason, that experience, unlike technical expertise, cannot be 
taught to others, as Aristotle emphasized: experience only truly addresses us in the singular. 
“[N]obody can teach their experience to another, for the experience they teach is always their own.” 
While “[o]nly events teach in the strict sense,” they do not transmit any knowledge or even empirical 
data. Experiences only teach us “to unlearn, to undo our prior knowledge and certitudes, by holding 
ourselves ready to learn anew from events themselves.”63 They hold us open to the “non-sense” 
inherent in every meaningful encounter with reality, to the inexhaustible excess of meaningfulness 
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that always makes our comprehension or grasp of the situation inevitably finite and partial.64 Ex-per-
ience, hyphenated by Romano in order to highlight the root *per-, is fundamentally an encounter with 
one’s limits, one’s essential finitude. In this sense, the limit-experiences of suffering and mortality—
encounters with the limits of our physical and mental capacity to endure reality as well as the essential 
temporal limitedness and inescapable incompleteness of our capacity for meaningful encounters in 
general—are experiences par excellence.65 
All in all, we see that even hermeneutic experience is “methodical” in the sense of being a 
dialectical process of transformation and development; but it is a dialectic without ultimate 
reconciliation, a method without teleology, without end or telos, a path followed indefinitely for its 
own sake in order to keep our thinking alive. As recapitulated by Gadamer, hermeneutic experience 
is  
 
experience of human finitude [Endlichkeit]. The truly experienced person [Erfahren] is one who 
has taken this to heart, who knows that she is master neither of time nor the future. . . . Genuine 
experience is that whereby the human being becomes aware of her finitude. In it are discovered 
the limits of the power and the self-knowledge of her planning reason. . . . Genuine experience 
is experience of one’s own historicity [Geschichtlichkeit].66 
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